Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1970

Hazel 0. Sanford v. University of Utah : Brief of Respondent Hazel
O. Sanford

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Frederick S. Prince, Jr. Kenneth W. Yeates; Attorneys for
Respondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Sanford v. University of Utah, No. 12176 (1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5321

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HAZEL 0. SANFORD,
Plaintiff MUI, Respontlent,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, an
agency of the State of Utah,
Defendant MUI, .AppellMJt.

;

BRIEF OF' RES ·
HAZEL 0. SANP ·
Appeal From Judgment of the · ';',
of the Third Judicial District m. ..
Salt Lake County, State W; . .
Honorable Bryant H. c.ioEt,: ' .

ILE D
DEC7-1970

MULIJND,;.
_,.

FREDIUUCK S. · .

JR., Esq.

. , ,.

KENNETH w...·

206E1PasoN
Salt Lake City, .. , •
.Attorne1s for· ..-..

WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
RAYMOND M. BERRY, Esq.
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys fOf' Appellant

-

.

·r....

INDEX
Page

NATURE OF THE CASE----------------------DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ________

1

___ _______________

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL _______ _______ _________ ______ ---------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS --------------------------------------------------------------------

2

ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5
POINT I
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, AS THE OWNER OF
THE REAL PROPERTY, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
DAMAGES RESULTING FROM DIVERSION OF
THE NATURAL DRAINAGE FLOW OF SURFACE
WATERS FROM ITS PROPERTY ------------------------------------ 5
POINT II
THE CAUSE OF ACTION UPON WHICH RESPONDENT RECOVERED DID NOT REQUIRE A SHOWING OF NEGLIGENCE AND SO NO PREJUDICIAL
ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN THE L 0 WE R
COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT ON NEGLIGENCE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7
POINT III
SECTION 10 OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT LIMIT OR MODIFY
SECTIONS 8 AND 9 ---------------------------------- --------------------------- 11
POINT IV.
APPELLANT IS PROHIBITED FROM RAISING
THE DEFENSE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
BY VIRTUE OF ITS PURCHASE OF INSURANCE
COVERING THIS RISK -----····-------·--···-··---···-----·--··········-···--17
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REDUCING THE
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF ·--··-··--······-·--·---·-------··----------·····----······-····---···········--······---··--·
23
CONCLUSION _

------·------------------- --------····-------··--·----·--··-·-····-------·---·-·-25

INDEX (Continued)
Page

AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Andrew Jergens Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 229 P.2d 475
(Cal. App. 1951) ·--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P.2d 986 (1961) ----------------19, 22
Geislinger v. Village of Watkins, 130 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. 1964) _______ 21
Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservation District No. 1
v. Roosevelt Irrigation District, 6 P.2d 898 (Ariz. 1932)____________ 9
Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservation District No. 1
v. Warford, 206 P.2d 1168 (Ariz. 1949) ·--------------------------------------- 8
Marshall v. City of Green Bay, 118 N.W.2d 715 (Wisc. 1963) ............ 21
North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. Utah and Salt Lake
Canal Co., 16 Utah 246, 52 Pac. 168 (1898) ··-------------------------------- 8
Reeder v. Brigham City, 17 Utah 2d 398, 413 P.2d 300 (1966) .... 9, 10, 15
Roosevelt Irrigation District v. Beardsley Land and Investment
Company, 282 Pac. 937 (Ariz. 1929) ----------------------------·---···--·--·------- 9
Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School District
No. 201, 109 N.E.2d 636 (Ill. App. 1952) -····--····-······---------------------22
Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 24 Utah 2d 217,
15
469 P.2d 5 (1970) ·---·-------------···--··---·-··--------··--··--------·····----····---------14,
Statutes
Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1967), Section 63-10-7 ···-·------------- 6
Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1967), Section 63-30-1 ________________ 5, 11
Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1967), Section 63-30-4 -----·--·--------- 16
Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1967),
Sections 63-30-5 through 9 ··--·----------------·-----··-·-·-----------···--··-···-----12,
13
Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1967),
Sections 63-30-5 through 10 ··········-----------------····-----·-·········-·-------·--···
16
Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1967),
Section 63-30-8 -----···----·············-------·---------········------------13,
14, 15, 16, 17
Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1967),
Section 63-30-9 ··--···-···---··---·····---·--··-----··-····--·---------11,
13, 14, 15, 16, 17
Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1967),
Section 63-30-28 ·-----··············--···--··-··----··--·-··--·------------·------···-----------17
Utah
Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1967),
o
18, 2
Section 63-30-29 ······--·-------·-····-······--·····-------·-·-······--··---·········-·-17,
Utah
Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1967),
o
18, 2
Section 63-30-30 ····---------···-····---·-···-··----------------------------------------------

INDEX (Continued)
Page
Treatises
2 Thompson, On Real Property, Perm. ed. §662 ----------------------------------

9

Law Reviews and Other Articles
Note, The Utah Governmental Immunity Act:
An Analysis, 1967, Utah Law Rev. 121 ---------------------------------------- 19
Van Alstyne, Governmental Torts in Utah, Part Two,
The Summation, Winter 1968 ------------------------------------------------13, 19, 22
Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change,
1966, University of Illinois Law Forum ---------------------------------------- 19
Miscellaneous
Annotation, 59 ALR 2d 424 ----------------------------------------------------------------------

7

IN THE SUPREME CO,URT
0 F THE STATE OF UTAH
1

HAZEL 0. SANFORD,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF UT AH, an
agency of the State of Utah,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
12176

BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT
HAZEL 0. SANFORD
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent, the plaintiff below, brought an action
for property damages sustained in a flood caused by the
diversion of the natural flow of surface waters.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A jury trial was held in the District Court of the
Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding. The jury returned
a verdict in favor of Respondent and against Appellant
for $13,687.00. The damages were assessed as follows:
$5,350.00 for loss of personal property, $3,337.00 for
1

damage to real and personal property, and $5,000.00 for
diminution in value of real property. The lower court
judge denied Appellant's motion for a new trial conditioned upon Respondent's consenting to a remittitur of
$500.00. Respondent consented to the remittitur, and
judgment was entered for $13,187.00 plus costs. Appellant has appealed the entire judgment, and Respondent
has cross appealed that part of the judgment which reduced the damages attributable to diminution in value of
real property by $500.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this court reversing the
trial court as to the $500.00 which Respondent was forced
to remit from the jury verdict. In all other respects, Re·
spondent requests that this court affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, a widow 70 years of age, owns real
property at 8 North Wolcott, in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R.
229) Directly to the east of this property sits the Merrill
Engineering Building with its adjacent parking lot. (Ex.
16-D) All of the property to the east of Respondent's ,
property is owned by Appellant and has been so owned
at all times material herein. (R. 362-364; 458-459) A
peripheral road lies on Appellant's property between Re·
spondent' s property line and the Merrill Engineering
Building. (Ex. 16-D) The terrain in this area is steeply
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contoured with the Merrill Engineering Building sitting
on a hill above Respondent's property.
Prior to the construction of the Merrill Engineering
Building, its site was used for a part of the Fort Douglas
golf course. The natural drainage of this site, both before
and during its use as a golf course, was to the north rather
than towards Respondent's property. (R. 232) In the almost fifty years Respondent had occupied her home, there
had been no flood problems. (R. 233)
Prior to 1963 the University of Utah added a substantial amount of fill, changed the natural contour and
constructed upon this site the Merrill Engineering Building. (R. 234; 528) In 1963 a severe flood caused damage
to Respondent's home and property. (R. 506-507; 236-237)

In 1967 a parking lot was constructed north of the
Merrill Engineering Building and east of the peripheral
road. (R. 528-529) The lot was built to provide parking
space north of the Merrill Engineering Building for 800
automobiles. (R. 504) The work was designed by Carston
& Hansen Landscape Architects, and was performed by
the Gibbons & Reed Construction Company. (R. 513) The
parking lot was contoured so that all water which might
fall upon it would be channeled into two drains which
were located directly east of Respondent's home. (R. 454455) From these drains; which are connected, an 18" concrete pipe was installed to convey all water down to the
peripheral road. (R. 454-455) Although the construction
plans called for a 24" reinforced concrete pipe from the
peripheral road to Federal Way (R. 368), the pipe ac-
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tually installed (which was still there as of the trial of
this matter) was a 21" corrugated metal pipe. (R. 368)
While the planned 24" reinforced concrete pipe would
have carried 19 cubic feet of water per second, the cor·
rugated metal pipe would and will carry only 10.6 cubic
feet per second. (R. 377) Respondent's engineer testified
that the runoff area serviced by the drain required a 30
reinforced concrete pipe or a 36" corrugated metal pipe
from the peripheral road to Federal Way. (R. 378) Appellant presented no testimony controverting either the
size pipe required, the size pipe shown in the construction
plans or the size pipe actually installed.
11

·On July 16, 1967, after the lot had been graded and
graveled, a rainstorm struck the area of the University
campus. (R. 3 7 5) The drainage facilities were inadequate
to handle the water flowing off the parking lot and hill,
and Respondent's home was severely flooded. (R. 439·
440) This flooding occurred despite University assurances
to Respondent that the debacle of 1963 would not be repeated. (R. 245) Appellant's witness claimed that the
rainstorm was "excessive" but that he had seen a storm of
this size "twice in the three and a half years" he had been
in Salt Lake City. (R. 584) Respondent's engineer testified that engineers normally design storm sewers so as to
make them adequate for the size storm which appears, on
the average, once every ten years. (R. 375)
The jury awarded Respondent damages. Appellant
raises three objections to the jury verdict:
(1) That the University of Utah was an improper

party defendant;
4

(2) That the Jury should have been instructed on
negligence;
( 3) That the defense of sovereign immunity should
have barred this action.
The first two of these objections reflect Appellant's
failure to recognize the theory upon which Respondent
recovered. The third point questions the lower court's interpretation of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Utah Code Annotated 63-30-1, et. seq. (Repl. Vol. 1967).
Respondent's cross appeal challenges the findings of
the trial court that the evidence of diminution of value of
Respondent's home, caused by the likelihood of future
floods, did not support the jury's finding of $5,000.00 in
damages.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, AS THE OWNER
OF THE REAL PROPERTY, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
DAMAGES RESULTING FROM DIVERSION OF THE
NATURAL DRAINAGE FLOW OF SURFACE
WATERS FROM ITS PROPERTY.

Appellant asserts that the acts, conduct, omissions or
defective conditions complained of were created or caused
by other state agencies or other persons not subject to its
supervision or control. This claim ignores Appellant's
liability as owner of the property and the statutory relationship between the Building Board and other state
institutions. Appellant was the owner of the land upon
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which was constructed the Merrill Engineering Building,
its parking lot, the peripheral road and the planted area
on both sides of the road. This property was deeded to
Appellant from the Federal Government in 1948. (R. 459)
The trial established that there was no transfer of an
easement or right-of-way on the parking lot or the periph·
eral road. Despite these facts, Appellant appears to be
arguing that it had nothing to do with the construction.
To support this argument, Appellant asserts that the
statutory scheme establishing the Building Board envisions
that the Building Board shall be separate and independent
of the state agencies for whom it works. This argument
is misleading and disingenuous, to say the least. Section
63-10-7 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1967) outlines,
in part, powers and duties of the Building Board:
"(1) To cause to be prepared in conjunction with
the institutions a masterplan of structure built or
contemplated, ... "

" ( 5) . . . to determine . . . the need for all altera·
tions and repairs to all existing buildings of the
state and of the departments, commissions, insti·
tutions and agencies of. the state where the esti·
mated cost is in excess of $8,000, and to exercise
supervision over the design, construction and in·
stallation of heating plants and appurtenances
thereto in all state buildings; provided, that no
building shall be constructed, improvements made
or work done for, or on the property of, any state
institution until the location, design, plans and
specifications therefor shall be approved by the
board, commission or officials charged with the ad·
ministration of the affairs of such institution."
(Emphasis added.)
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Appellant rightly claims that the Building Board has the
responsibility to prepare plans and supervise construction.
Appellant incorrectly implies that the statutory scheme
gives the local institutions, such as Appellant, no control
over the plans that are adopted. Both for the adoption of
the "master plan" and for all major construction work
done for or on its property, Appellant must approve or
disapprove of the plans prepared and submitted. In fact,
the Building Board cannot act without such approval or
disapproval. Whether Appellant exercised its statutory
responsibility is irrelevant. The statute imposes upon Appellant control over the alteration of the natural drainage
which caused a flood and created the present flood danger.
POINT II
THE CAUSE OF ACTION UPON WHICH RESPONDENT RECOVERED DID NOT REQUIRE A
SHOWING OF NEGLIGENCE AND SO NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN THE LOWER
COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT ON NEGLIGENCE.

Respondent recovered because Appellant, as the owner of higher land, was responsible for damage resulting
from changes made in the natural flow of surface waters.
This cause of action is universally recognized throughout
the United States with minor variations in theory and
formulation. It is uniformly held that an upper landowner ordinarily has no right to artificially collect surface
wate1·s and discharge them in a mass upon the lower proprietor to the latter's damage. See Annotation, 59 ALR 2d
424 at 442.
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The earliest Utah pronouncement on the point was
in North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. Utah and
Salt Lake Canal Co., 16 Utah 246, 52 Pac. 168 (1898):
"Undoubtedly a proprietor of higher land is entitled to the benefits of the natural flow therefrom,
onto the lands of another, of surface or other waters
not brought there by artificial means. But, when
water is brought onto the higher land by artificial
means, the proprietor is not entitled to such natural
flow onto the land of another, to his injury. The
proprietors of higher lands have not the right to
the natural flow of waters brought on to their
lands by an artificial means." (Supra, at 17 3) (Emp,hasis added.)
In Andrew Jergens Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 229
P.2d 475 (Cal. App. 1951), the California court stated:

"Every landowner must bear the burden of receiv·
ing upon his land the surface water naturally falling upon land above it and naturally flowing to it
therefrom, and he has the corresponding right to
have the surface water naturally falling upon his
land or naturally coming upon it, flow freely therefrom upon the lower land adjoining, as it would
flow under natural conditions .. From these rights
and burdens, the principal follows that he has a
lawful right to complain of others, who, by interfering with natural conditions, cause such surface
water to be discharged in greater quantity or in a
different manner upon his land, than would occur
under natural conditions. This is the settled law of
this state." (Supra, at 477) (Emphasis added.)
In Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservation
District No. 1 v. Warford, 206 P.2d 1168 (Ariz. 1949) the
Arizona Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier position that:
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"A land owner has no right to collect surface water
in an artificial channel and discharge it in large
quantities upon the land of a lower owner to his
damage, ... " Citing Roosevelt Irrigation District
v. Beardsley Land and Investment Company, 282
Pac. 937 (Ariz. 1929); Maricopa County Municipal
Water Conservation District No. 1 v. Roosevelt Irrigation District, 6 P.2d 898 (Ariz. 1932). (Supra,
at 1174)
2 Thompson, On Real Property, Perm. ed., §662 formulates the rule thusly:
"The right of the upper landowner to discharge
water on the lower lands of his neighbor is in
general a right of flowage only in the natural ways
and natural quantities. If he alters the natural condition so as to change the course of the water, or
concentrate it at a particular point, or by artificial
means to increase its volume, he becomes liable
for any injury caused thereby." (Emphasis added.)
(Footnotes omitted.)
These authorities affirm the rule that a plaintiff has
the right to be free from the artificial diversion of surface
waters onto his property whether through accident, negligence or intent.
This rule is Utah law. Reeder v. Brigham City, 17
Utah 2d 398, 413 P.2d 300 (1966). In Reeder, the city
diverted surface and percolating waters through manmade storm and drainage systems. The waters were then
dumped into the plaintiff's private irrigation system. Upon
appeal from a judgment granting an injunction against
Brigham City, the Supreme Court held that the evidence
supported findings that the city had altered the natural
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drainage and that the resulting diversion caused the excess '
waters to enter the plaintiff's land and irrigation ditches.
The court held:
"Appellants, having interfered with the natural
flow of the water, and by such interference having
caused the waters to be discharged in greater quantities and carried in a different manner than occurred under natural conditions, the court correctly granted the injunction. Respondent has the right
to be free from receiving waters on his land to his
damage which do not find their way in their
natural course and its natural conditions." (Supra,
at 302) (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
Inst'ructions 13 and 14 (R. 147; 148) were in conformity
with the holding of the Reeder case and were proper.
Point II of Appellant's brief asserts that if a finding
of negligence is not required, Appellant will be put in a
worse position than would be a private individual sued
under the same circumstances. Nothing could be further
from the truth. The jury found that Appellant diverted
the water from its natural drainage channel without pro·
viding an adequate drainage system. (Instruction 16, R.
150) Had such facts been found against any private litigant, the result would have been the same.
To buttress its argument to the effect that a higher
burden will be placed upon governmental entities than
upon a private defendant, Appellant cites eight cases.
None of these cases have anything to do with the diver·
sion of the flow of surface waters. They are negligence
cases where the normal rules of negligence law apply.
10

With these cases Respondent has no quarrel. Respondent
only wonders why they were cited.
POINT III
SECTION 10 OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNI1Y ACT DOES NOT LIMIT OR MODIFY
SECTIONS 8 AND 9.

Throughout the trial of this matter and in its brief
on appeal, Appellant claimed that it was immune from
suit. The trial judge ruled that the construction and maintenance of a parking lot, a peripheral road and a drainage
system were done by Appellant in its governmental capacity and that Appellant would therefore be immune from
suit for damage caused by the construction and maintenance of these improvements unless immunity was waived
by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the Act). Utah
Code Annotated 63-30-1, et. seq., (1967 Repl. Vol.) (See R.
486, et. seq.) The trial court instructed the jury that Appellant's immunity from suit had been waived under Section 9 of the Act if a defective or dangerous condition,
which was not latent, of a public improvement caused
damage to Respondent. (Instruction 14, R. 147). Section
9 provides:
"Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for any injury caused from a dangerous
or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement.
Immunity is not waived for latent defective conditions."
Despite the clear meaning of the foregoing section,
Appellant argues that Respondent cannot sue unless Appellant's immunity from suit is waived under Section 10
11

of the Act. Having made this assumption, Appellant argues that specific exceptions to waiver contained in Section IO prohibit this action. This argument involves a
unique application of the rules of statutory construction
and a total disregard of the plain meaning of the statute.
After a Title and Definitions section and a general
statement providing for governmental immunity except
whe1·e waived in the Act, the Act provides that any waiver
contained therein shall not be construed as an admission
or denial of liability but that, where immunity is waived,
liability will be determined as if the entity were a private
person. The next six sections provide for a waiver of immunity from suit for contractual obligations (Sec. 5), for
involving real or personal property (Sec. 6), for
actions involving the negligent operation of motor vehicles (Sec. 7), for actions involving the condition of public
improvements (Secs. 8 and 9) and for actions involving
the negligent acts or omissions of employees (Sec. 10).
Despite the fact that none of these sections refer to one or
more of the remaining sections, Appellant argues that
immunity is waived under Sections 8 and 9 only where
the conduct creating the condition was negligent and
where immunity would be waived for such negligent conduct under Section 10. Appellant seems to say that exceptions modifying Section 10 must be read to modify all the
provisions waiving immunity. Had the legislature so intended, it would have so written these exceptions into Sections 5 through 9.

A noted authority on governmental immunity, Professor Arvo Van Alstyne, has made the following com·
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ment about the broad waiver of immunity from suit contained in Secdon 10 and its relationship to Sections 8 and

9:

"The broad waiver, however, is also accompanied
by a series of specific exceptions - that is, a series
of specified instances in which the general waiver
of negligence immunity will not be applicable and
the public entity (unless liable under some other
statutory waiver of immunity) will be immune
from liability. The legislative purpose in spelling
out independently the specific waivers for negligent operation of motor vehicles and other equipment, and for dangerous and defective conditions
of public property, thus emerges plainly: these
specific waivers (in U.C.A. 63-30-7, 63-30-8 and
63-30-9) are not subject to the exceptions enumerated in the general waiver section (U.C.A. 63-3010) but are to be applied independently from the
latter section. This is an exceedingly important
concept which is crucial to the proper understanding of the list of exceptions in section 63-30-10 and
the types of cases to which those exceptions apply.
Had the Legislature intended the listed exceptions
to apply to motor vehicles or dangerous condition
cases, there would have been no need to provide
separately for these grounds of liability, for the
general waiver of negligence immunity would have
been enough. Thus, it follows that the exceptions
in section 10 do not so apply." Van Alstyne, Governmental Torts in Utah, Part Two, The Summation, Winter 1968, at page 7. (R. 66)
Appellant may still argue that Section 10 modifies
Sections 8 and 9 in those cases where a showing of negligence is a prerequisite to plaintiff's recovery. If so, Appellant's argument can be summarily disposed of at this
time. Although Respondent alleged negligence as an al-
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ternative cause of action, no instructions were given on
negligence, the issue of negligence was never before the
jury and Respondent does not here rely upon a negligence
theory.
Appellant has found some comfort in a statement,
found in the case of Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co., 24 Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970), which may imply
that the discretionary function exception in subparagraph
( 4) of Section 10 should apply to all actions brought under Sections' 8 and 9. In Velasquez, a passenger sued the
Utah Public Service Commission and the defendant railroad alleging negligence on the part of the Public Service
Commission in failing to require proper and adequate
safety devices at a railroad crossing. Following a nonsuit
in the trial court, the plaintiff appealed claiming that the
Public Service Commission was negligent in that it (1)
did not require the railroad company to install adequate
protective devices and (2) did not systematically discover
dilapidated signs. The Utah Supreme Court held that the
behavior involved was discretionary and so the act did
not waive the Public Service Commission's immunity from
suit.

In no way could a railroad safety device installed and
maintained by the railroad be construed as a dangerous
and defective condition of a public improvement but is
instead an improvement owned and operated by the railroad. Accordingly, any allegation that immunity should
be waived by Sections 8 and 9 was clearly improper. The
only section available to the plaintiff in the Velasquez case
to establish a waiver of immunity from suit was Section
14

10. The court quite properly treated the case as one
brought under Section 10 for negligence and then upheld
the trial court because any negligent conduct which might
have been found on the part of the Public Service Commission was in the exercise of a discretionary function.
To the extent that the Velasquez case might be interpreted as holding that where negligence is required in
a cause of action alleged under Sections 8 and 9 it is subject to the exceptions contained in Section 10, Respondent
believes the Velasquez case to be in error. However, even
a holding to this effect is not fatal to Respondent's case
because negligence is not required for a cause of action
alleging diversion of the flow of surface waters (see Supra,
pp. 7-11). The plaintiff in Velasquez attempted to recover
on a theory of negligence. Thus, even such an extreme interpretation of the Velasquez case has no bearing on the
instant case.
Appellant's argument that damages should not be
granted in this case because damages were not granted
against Brigham City in Reeder, supra, must also fail. This
court held in Reeder that the city acted in a governmental
capacity. The conduct complained of occurred in 1962 and
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was not passed
until three years later. For this reason the city was immune from suit and damages could not be granted against
it. This fact has now been changed with the passage of
the Act.
Contrary to Appellant's argument, the Reeder case
does not characterize diversion of surface waters as a
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nuisance. Even if it did, such a characterization would not
preclude recovery. The Act bases its waivers of immunity
from suit upon contractual obligations, title to property,
acts of employees or agents, conditions of public improvements and limited cases of negligence. For the most part
these areas of waiver do not involve legally cognizable
causes of action. Section 4 provides:
"Nothing contained in this act, unless specifically
provided, is to be construed as an admission or
denial of liability or responsibility in so far as
governmental entities are concerned. Wherein immun,ity from suit is waived by this act, consent to
be sued is granted and liability of the entity shall
be determined as if the entity were a private per,,
son.
Thus, even though the Act waives immunity from suit,
the plaintiff must allege and prove a legally cognizable
cause of action. In certain sections, such as 8 and 9, there
is no correlation between the areas where the Act waives
immunity and the cause of action. Since Section 4 says
that liability will be determined as though the governmental entity is a private person, a plaintiff who can allege and prove a nuisance, or any other cause of action, is
allowed recovery against a governmental agency where
there has been a waiver under any of Sections 5 through
10.
Appellant argues that because its activities in design·
ing and locating the parking lot were discretionary, there
is no waiver of immunity. This is a remarkably skillful
job of setting up a straw man. As pointed out, Supra pp.
11-15, Section 10 of the Act has no bearing on this case,

16

and thus Appellant's arguments about discretion are
relevant.

ir-

Although not required for Respondent's case, Sections 8 and 9 might also be interpreted to create new
causes of action. Thus, it is arguable that whenever there
is a defective or dangerous condition in the enumerated
public structures for which immunity is waived, the claimant has a cause of action. If this is the proper interpretation of these two sections, then the discretionary function
exception of Section 10 does not apply. On both readings
of Sections 8 and 9, it is impossible to see how the defense
of sovereign immunity would be available to the Appellant in the present case.
POINT IV
APPELLANT IS PROHIBITED FROM RAISING
THE DEFENSE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
BY VIRTUE OF ITS PURCHASE OF INSURANCE
COVERING THIS RISK.

Although the trial court ruled to the contrary (R.
79-80), Appellant is precluded from raising the defense
of governmental immunity because it has purchased liability insurance to insure it against the risk involved in
this case. Section 63-30-28 Utah Code Annotated (Repl.
Vol. 1967) provides that any governmental entity may purchase insurance against any risk which may arise as the
result of the application of the Act. Section 29 of the Utah
Act requires certain provisions in all insurance so purchased. Subsection (a) of that section provides:

17

"In respect to bodily injury liability that the insurance carrier shall pay on behalf of the insured governmental entity all sums which the insured would

in the absence of the defense of governmental immunity be legally obligated to pay as damages became of bodily injury, .... "
(Emphasis added.)
Subsection (b) requires:
"In respect to property damage liability that the
insurance carrier shall pay on behalf of the insured
governmental entity all sums which the insured
would in the absence of the defense of governmentdl immunity be legally obligated to pay as
damages because of injury to or destruction of
property, .... "(Emphasis added.)
The foregoing policy provisions require the insurance
carrier to agree to pay all claims which the governmental
entity must pay absent any defense of governmental immunity. In short, the insurance company must take the
same risks it would take if it were insuring a private
entity such as Kennecott Copper Corporation. However,
reliance need not be based upon these subsections alone.
Section 30 of the Act provides that:
"Every contract or policy of insurance purchased
under the terms of this act for any or all risks created by this act shall include a provision or endorsement by which the insurer agrees not to assert the
defense of sovereign immunity, and to pay all sums
for which it would otherwise be liable under its
contract or policy of insurance." (Emphasis added.)
The proposition that the Act prohibits an insurance
company defending a suit against any governmental en18

tity from asserting the defense of sovereign immunity is
amply supported by the authorities. Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966, University of Illinois Law Forum, 919, 967; Note, The Utah
Governmental Immunity Act: An Analysis, 1967, Utah
Law Rev. 121, 147; Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort in
Utah, Part Two, The Summation, Winter 1968, page 7 at
page 8 (R. 66). Should insurance purchased by a governmental entity not contain the waiver provision, Section 31
provides that the policy will nevertheless be construed as
though it contained the required provision.
Governmental agencies (under the Act) purchase liability insurance to protect themselves against financial loss
and to protect the public injured by acts of the governmental entity. Insurance companies should not be allowed
to subvert the policy of the Act. This court, in the case of
Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P.2d 986 (1961),
decided prior to the Act, reached the heart of the problem
when it stated:
''The city did have a liability policy, purporting to
cover the loss, but still asserted the defense of sovereign immunity, which apparently was a waste of
the taxpayers' money." (Supra, at 989) (Emphasis
added.)
By enacting Section 30 of the Act, the legislature indicated its agreement with the court's analysis in Cobia
that the purchase of insurance when the insurer can raise
the defense of governmental immunity would waste the
taxpayers' money.
Appellant will undoubtedly assert that the purchase
of liability insurance is only to cover risks created by the
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Act, i.e., risks where immunity is waived. However, if this
is the case, then Section 29 (a) and (b) and Section 30,
Supra, are entirely superfluous and useless. The defense
of immunity cannot be raised as to risks created by waiver
of immunity under the Act. This was the whole purpose
of the Act. If the insurance company is only insuring
against the risks created by waiver of immunity, there
would be no defense of sovereign immunity left it to waive
under Section 30. It would be absurd to construe the
statute in such a manner. When the legislature required
the insurance. companies to waive a defense, it obviously
intended that there be something to waive. Therefore,
it must have been intended that the purchase of liability
insurance creates a waiver of all immunity defenses for
the risks insured against. Clarifying its intention, the
legislature added that the insurer must agree " ... to pay
all sums for which it would otherwise be liable (if it had
not insured a governmental entity) under its contract or
policy of insurance."
Those entities not purchasing insurance are still subject only to the specific waiver of immunity set out in the
statute. Thus, an insurance company, by a waiver of the
defense of sovereign immunity, would be waiving something worthwhile. Since it is covered by insurance, the
governmental entity would be giving up nothing. Thus,
the policies of the Act - entity protection and protection
of the injured party - are completely fulfilled. In addition, the entire statute is given effect.
The authorities previously cited agree with this construction of the Act. In addition, there is case law support20

ing the interpretation advocated here. In Marshall v. City
of Green Bay, 118 N.W.2d 715 (Wisc. 1963), the city was
sued for damages for its alleged negligence in the operation of a toboggan hill run located outside of the city
corporate limits. The city had purchased an insurance
policy containing a provision wherein the insurer agreed
not to raise the defense of governmental immunity. Hence,
the issue was whether, by such a contract with the insurance company, the city would waive its tort immunity. In
deciding this question, the court stated:
"The imrrnnity granted municipalities from tort
li::ibili<:y '"'as created by case law basically and primarily to protect public funds and property. Such
immunity can be waived by the municipality when
it has secured that purpose by insurance and believes a w2iver to be advantageous or desirable."
Supra, at 717.
Thus, the court concluded that even without a statute purporting to do what the Utah statute does, a muncipality
could provide by contract for a waiver of the immunity
defense. The court further stated:
"We construe this agreement to be a waiver of
governmental immunity by the city recognized and
agreed to by the insurer . . . . Under such circumstances to allow the city to insist on its immunity
by a defense controlled by the insurer would be a
virtual fraud and the mirnse of public funds."
Supra, at 718.
This case is in accord with a growing list of jurisdictions
taking this view. See cases cited at page 718 of the Marshall opinion. In the case of Geislinger v. Village of Watkins, 130 N.W. 2d 62 (Minn. 1964), the court construed
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a specific statute providing for waiver of immunity defenses to mean that the insurer could not assert these defenses at all.
In Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated
School District No. 201, 109 N.E.2d 636 (Ill. App. 1952),
an action was brought for personal injury occurring on a
playground owned by a school district. The school district
carried liability insurance even though it was not authorized to carry such insurance under the law, and the court
held the purchase of such insurance to be a waiver of the
immunity defense.
In Cobia, the Utah Supreme Court held that the operation of a sewer was not a proprietary function and,
therefore, could not be actionable absent a legislative
waiver of immunity. At that time, prior to the enactment
of the Governmental Immunity Act, this court held that
the purchase of liability insurance did not constitute a
waiver of immunity. By the passage of the Governmental
Immunity Act, the Utah legislature prohibited the misuse
of public funds condemned in Cobia. This it did in explicit
terms. See Van Alstyne, Governmental Torts in Utah, Part
Two, The Summation, Winter 1968, at 9. (R. 68) There
would be grave injustice in allowing an insurance company to take Utah tax dollars as insurance premiums and
then to avoid liability to an injured Utah taxpayer on the
grounds that the State could not be held liable for the risk
the State had insured against.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REDUONG
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED TO
PLAINTIFF.

The jury returned a verdict of $13,687 for plaintiff.
(R. 195) Of this amount $5,000 was for diminution in
value of real property due to the continuing threat of
future floods. On the 11th day of June, 1970, an order
was entered by the trial court judge. Paragraph 1 of the
order stated:
"Defendant's motion for a new trial is denied and
as a condition to denial of said motion it is ordered
that the sum of $500 be deducted from the judgment on the jury verdict and the sum of $500 is
hereby deducted from the judgment on the jury
verdict, as being excessive and not supported by
the evidence regarding diminution of value." (R.
202)
The lower court judge felt that the plaintiff's evidence
was insufficient to sustain the $5,000 damage award. A
careful reading of the record shows that the evidence was
in fact sufficient. Plaintiff presented the testimony of
Werner Kiepe, an appraiser. (R. 398, et. seq.) Mr. Kiepe
first determined the value of Respondent's home prior to
the construction of the parking lot. (R. 411) Mr. Kiepe
then assumed that a flood threat was created by the construction of the public improvement - which fact was
later found by the jury - (R. 412) and stated that he
arrived at a new value:
"A The well informed buyer should certainly
know, or perhaps even be told by a seller that this
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house had been exposed to two floods. To him this
would mean that he probably wouldn't even consider the house because of the fact that it had been
the victim of two floods. However, that would
eliminate a part of market. However, there are certain people who would do two things: First of all
they would try to correct, as far as they could, the
problem, and secondly, they would drive a sharper
bargain; they would figure they were in the driver's seat, that the seller was not in a favorable
position, and so taking those two factors into consideration I arrived at a value after the flood." (R.
411-412)
Mr. Kiepe then stated that the diminution due to the
buyer's advantageous bargaining position was $4,500. (R.
412) and that corrective measures costing $1,000 would
also be deducted from the price a buyer would pay. (R.
413) So as to leave no doubt, Mr. Kiepe summarized his
findings on direct examination as follows:

"Q Now, what do you get when you add the total
of the discount and the cost of the cure in your
opinion?
A $5500.00.

Q And what does this $5500.00 represent?
A It represents the difference between the before
and after value.

Q Now, this $5500.00 that is the difference be-

tween the before and after value, does that - if
that were awarded to Mrs. Sanford would that
compensate her for repairs to her personal property, repairs to the structure and things such as
this?

A No." (R. 413)
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The jury's finding of $5,000 was $500 less than the
limits of the foregoing testimony. The order of the trial
court judge was in error and should be reversed. This
court should order that the original jury verdict of $13,687
should be the judgment in the case.

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the judgment
of the lower court should be affirmed in all respects except for the reduction of $500.00 in damages awarded for
diminution in value of Respondent's home. With respect
to the said $500.00, this court should order that the
$500.00 remittitur be restored and that judgment should
be entered in favor of plaintiff for the amount of
$13,687.00.
Respectfully submitted,

MULLINER, PRINCE &
MANGUM
Frederick S. Prince, Jr.
Kenneth W. Yeates
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